

























The present paper describes recent research on two central themes of 
Keynes’ General Theory: (i) the social waste associated with recessions, and 
(ii) the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. The paper also 
discusses some evidence on the extent to which fiscal policy has been used 
as a stabilizing tool in industrial economies over the past two decades. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to describe some recent research on two themes 
that have a strong Keynesian flavor: (i) the social waste associated with recessions, and 
(ii) the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. Keynes analysis of both 
themes constitutes the core of the General Theory and, arguably, his most enduring 
contribution to economics. 
 
As part of the recent revival of Keynesian macroeconomics, some authors have 
revisited both themes, taking advantage of the tools and concepts that have been 
developed and adopted in recent years. In the present paper I summarize some my own 
recent research on the costs of recessions and the stabilizing role of fiscal policy in the 
postwar period.  The basic argument of the paper can be summarized as follows.  
 
•  Recent empirical evidence suggests that business cycle fluctuations are associated 
with large variations in the degree of aggregate efficiency in the economy or, in 
other words, in the distance to “first-best”. That evidence is summarized in 
section 2. 
 
•  The presence of large efficiency gaps in periods of recession justifies the pursuit 
of countercyclical fiscal policies, with government spending being set at a level 
above that warranted by “efficient provision of public goods” considerations. Section 3 develops a simple analytical framework which justifies the pursuance of 
countercyclical fiscal policies in a world in which recessions are associated with 
declines in aggregate efficiency. 
 
•  The empirical evidence points to the adoption of increasingly countercyclical 
policies by governments in OECD countries over the postwar period, as shown in 
section 4. In light of the arguments made in section 3, such trends in fiscal policy 
should be welcome.  
 
Next I discuss each of the three themes in turn. 
 
 
2.  A New-Keynesian Perspective on the Welfare Costs of Business 
Cycles 
 
In broad terms, and at the risk of oversimplification, one can think of two competing 
views of the business cycle. The first view, which I will refer to as neoclassical, is best 
exemplified in our days by Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory. Under that view, business 
cycles can be interpreted as the economy’s optimal response to shocks, at least to a first-
order approximation. While some inefficiencies and distortions may be present in the 




An alternative view of business cycles, which I will label as Keynesian, interprets 
recessions as periods in which the utilization of productive resources is inefficiently low, 
while expansions are viewed as times when the level of economic activity approaches its 
social optimum. Thus, according to this second view, business cycles are associated in a 
fundamental way with variations over time in the efficiency of aggregate resource 
allocations. 
 
In recent work with Mark Gertler and J. David López-Salido
2 (GGL, henceforth) we 
have developed a framework that seeks to provide a quantitative assessment of the 
relevance of the Keynesian view of the cycle. Our starting point is a measure of distance 
between an economy’s activity level and the efficient one. That measure, which we refer 
to as “the gap” takes the following form: 
  t tt gap mrs mpn = −  
where  denotes the (log) marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
leisure, and   is the (log) marginal product of labor (or, equivalently, the marginal 
rate of transformation between consumption and hours). The efficient level of economic 
activity is implicitly determined by the condition
t mrs
t mpn
0 t gap = . The presence of distortions of 
different sorts (market power, distortionary taxes) will generally imply that the gap 
                                                 
1 Prescott (1986) constitutes a classical reference for an exposition of the neoclassical view. 
2 Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2005) variable takes a negative value (corresponding to an inefficiently low level of economic 
activity).  
 
As shown in GGL, given a parametric specification for the marginal product of labor 
and the marginal rate of substitution, it is possible to construct a measure of the gap or, to 
be more precise, of its fluctuations around its mean. The reader will find a derivation of 
that measure in Appendix A to the present paper. GGL’s analysis of the time series 
properties of the resulting measure points to two key properties of the gap variable for the 
postwar U.S.: (i) a high volatility, with a standard deviation that is systematically larger 
than the one for conventional output gap measures, and (ii) a high positive correlation 
with conventional measures of the output gap. Those findings are illustrated in Figure 1, 
which displays the time series for GGL’s gap variable (under GGL’s baseline 
assumptions). In particular, we see how NBER-dated recessions, which are represented 
by the vertical grid lines, correspond to periods of large declines in the gap variable. 
 
The combination of the two findings described above can be interpreted as providing 
favorable evidence for the Keynesian view of business cycles: they point to large 
fluctuations in the degree of inefficiency in the aggregate allocation of resources, and 
suggest a systematic relationship of those fluctuations with the business cycles, with 
recessions corresponding to periods with unusually large aggregate inefficiencies. 
  
GGL show that the gap variable can be written as (minus) the sum of two 
components. The first component, denoted by
p
t µ  represents the wedge between (log) labor productivity and the (log) real wage, and has the natural interpretation of an average 
price markup, i.e. a measure of the deviation from perfect competition in goods markets. 
The second component, denoted by
w
t µ  is the difference between the (log) real wage and 
the (log) marginal rate of substitution, and can thus be thought of as a labor market 
wedge measure, reflecting distortions in that market (including non-competitive wage 
setting, as well as labor income and payroll taxes) . As shown in appendix A, and given 
our gap definition, it follows by construction that 
  (
pw
tt gap ) t µ µ =− +   
 
Accordingly, and given the findings mentioned above, recessions must be associated, 
at least on average, with a higher wedge in goods markets, labor markets, or both. While 
the work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), among others, had already stressed the 
countercyclical nature of price markups, the empirical analysis in GGL points to much 
larger variations in the labor market wedge,  which appears to be the dominant source of 
fluctuations in the gap variable. That evidence suggests that recessions correspond to 
periods in which real wages are too high relative to the opportunity cost of working.  
 
  The previous evidence raises an interesting issue closely connected with Keynes’ 
own perspective on the nature of recessions. It is clear that the well documented rigidity 
of nominal wages, together with the non-Walrasian nature of contractual relationships 
between workers and firms, may explain why real wages are so much higher than the 
marginal rate of substitution in downturns. Yet, it does not follow from that observation 
that making real wages fully flexible and, in the limit, restoring perfect competition in labor markets would suffice to restore a first best allocation. The reason is simple: to the 
extent that the enhanced wage flexibility is not accompanied by an increase in the level of 
economic activity that brings about an increase in the marginal rate of substitution 
(and/or a decrease in the marginal product of labor), the decline in the labor market 
wedge will just be offset by an increase of equal size in the average price markup. But in 
a world where firms do not perceive the demand for their goods as being perfectly elastic, 
the only way to increase economic activity and hours worked (and, as a result, to reduce 
aggregate inefficiencies) is for aggregate demand to increase. But that increase in 
aggregate demand will not be brought about mechanically by the lower wages; instead it 
may require that appropriate fiscal and monetary policies are undertaken to guarantee that 
a higher level of activity is attained.
3
 
What are the welfare consequences of fluctuations in the gap variable? As shown in 
GGL the second order approximation to the utility gains or losses resulting from 
fluctuations in the gap variable takes the form: 
nn
2
t tt U U gap gap αβ −= −  
                                                 
3 In Keynes’ own words: “…there is no reason in general for expecting [the level of 
employment] to be equal to full employment. The effective demand associated with full 
employment is a special case, only realized when the propensity to consume and the 
inducement to invest stand in a particular relationship to one another. This particular 
relationship, which corresponds to the assumptions of the classical theory…can only exist 
when by accident or design, current investment provides an amount of demand just equal 
to the excess of [income]  over what the community will choose to spend on consumption 
when it is fully employed” [Keynes (1936), p. 28] where   denotes the (log) deviation of the gap variable from its steady 
state value, and where both 
n
t t gap gap gap ≡−
α  and β  are positive coefficients which are in turn a 
function of underlying primitive parameters.  
 
  The previous discussion, based on GGL’s analysis, has two natural implications 
for the design of macroeconomic policy. First, it provides a theoretical justification for 
countercyclical policies, at least to the extent that the business cycle involves fluctuations 
in the degree of efficiency of the aggregate allocation of resources. Yet, as it is clear from 
the expression above the gains from stabilizing the gap variable are of second order. 
Thus, GGL estimate those gains to be always below one-tenth of one percent of annual 
consumption, for the range of calibrations considered.  
 
The previous analysis, however, conceals an aspect of economic fluctuations that can 
have potentially important implication for the design of macroeconomic policy, 
potentially justifying activist countercyclical fiscal policies. The next section formalizes 




2.  A Case for Countercyclical Fiscal Policy 
 
The analysis of the gap variable and its fluctuations has an important additional 
dimension related to welfare that is worth emphasizing here. In a nutshell, the fact that fluctuations take place around a distorted (i.e., inefficient) steady state or balanced 
growth path implies that expansions and recessions will generally have first-order effects 
on welfare. To the extent that an increase in government purchases has an expansionary 
effect on the economy, there will be an incentive to raise that variable beyond what 
would be justified by a criterion based strictly on the efficient provision of public goods. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the degree of aggregate inefficiency is larger in recessions 
than in expansion (as the evidence summarized above would suggest), the incentive to 
raise government purchases will vary with the cycle, leading an optimizing government 
to pursue a countercyclical fiscal policy. 
  
The previous point can be illustrated by considering a highly stylized aggregative 
economy with preferences represented by the period utility 
    (, ,) ttt UC N G
and with a resource/market clearing constraint given by  
  tt YCG t = +  
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By equating the previous expression to zero we can derive an implicit optimal rule for 










)                (2)  
Hence, to the extent that (i) the level of economic activity is inefficiently low 
(0 ), and (ii) the government spending multiplier is positive ( ), the 
optimal fiscal policy satisfies  
t gap < / 0 tt dY dG >
  ,, Gt Ct UU <  
 
  We see thus that the optimal level of government purchases will remain above that 
associated with the simple criterion for the optimal provision of public goods, which in 
the stylized model above would require that the marginal utility of public and private 
consumption are equated. The reason is straightforward: in addition to satisfying the 
demand for public goods, government purchases can be used to increase employment, 
thus reducing the welfare losses resulting from an inefficiently low level of activity. 
 
It is also clear from expression (2) that the incentive to raise government spending 
will be greater the larger is the multiplier   and the lower (i.e., the more negative) 
is the   variable.
/ t dY dGt
                                                
t gap
4 Hence, and given a positive multiplier, the evidence of a highly 
procyclical behavior of the gap variable provided in the previous section would call for a 
countercyclical fiscal policy, i.e. increases in government spending in recession times 
(low gap), with spending cuts in periods of expansion. 
 
 
4 Models in the RBC tradition often predict relatively low government spending multipliers, as a 
consequence of crowding-out effects on consumption. Nevertheless, the introduction of non-Ricardian 
households, who consume their current income as opposed to their permanent income, combined with 
deficit financing can raise that multiplier dramatically, as shown in Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2004). How about taxes? While not formalized explicitly above, it is clear that distortionary 
taxes must be an important source of the efficiency gap. A simple way to represent that 
connection is to think of the gap variable as having two components: one related to 
(income) taxes and a second incorporating all other sources of gap variation (e.g., “pure” 
markups). In that context we would expect an optimizing government to use tax policy to 
reduce gap fluctuations. Thus if a decline in the gap occurs as a result of the higher 
markups induced, say, by the combination of an adverse demand shock and the presence 
of nominal rigidities, the government could in principle dampen the drop in the gap (and 
its first-order negative welfare effects) by lowering the tax rate transitorily and issuing 
debt, while waiting for an expansionary period to raise taxes again. If one combines that 
prescription for tax policies with the case for countercyclical government spending made 
above, it seems plausible to conclude that in an economy characterized by a distorted 
steady state and fluctuations in the efficiency gap, countercyclical government deficits 
should be desirable. Interestingly, and as described in the next section, governments in 
industrialized countries appear to have followed that prescription with increasing zeal 
over the past decades.  
 
4 .   S o m e  E v i d e n c e  o n  t h e  R o l e  of Fiscal Policy as a Source of 
Increasing Macroeconomic Stability 
 
Much recent empirical evidence points to a substantial decline in GDP volatility 
among industrialized countries over the past half-century.
5 Some of the explanations put 
                                                 
5 See, e.g. the surveys by Stock and Watson (2002, 2003). forward in order to account for that phenomenon are structural in nature: shift from goods 
to services, improvements in inventory management, better access to financial markets, 
etc. Several authors have pointed to smaller exogenous shocks (i.e. good luck) as a 
dominant factor. Finally, other authors have stressed the role of improved 
macroeconomic policies. 
 
In the present section I summarize some of the findings contained in a recent paper by 
Roberto Perotti and myself (henceforth, GP), which shed some light on one particular 
dimension of that debate, namely, the changing role of discretionary fiscal policy as a 
stabilizing factor.
6 While the main objective of GP was to provide an assessment of the 
extent to which the constraints associated with the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact affected in practice the way European governments have conducted fiscal 
policy, our work also shed some light on the evolution of discretionary fiscal policy for a 
broader set of countries. In particular, we use annual data for the period 1980-2002 for 
eleven EMU countries (all current members less Luxembourg), three non-EMU members 
of EU (UK, Denmark, and Sweden; henceforth, the EU3), and five non-EU countries 
(Norway, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States; henceforth, OECD5), and 
estimate a fiscal policy rule of the form 
                       { }
*
01 11 tx t t b t d t dE x b d φφ φ φ −− − =+ + + +
*
t u                   (3) 
where   is the cyclically adjusted (or structural) deficit for year t (measured as a share 
of potential GDP), 
*
t d
{ } 1 tt Ex −  is the year t-1 forecast of output gap for year t (i.e., the 
percent deviation of GDP from potential), and  1 t b −  is the amount of outstanding debt 
                                                 
6 See Galí and Perotti (2003) (relative to potential GDP) in period t-1. The use of the output gap forecast and the lag of 
the debt/GDP ratio in the above specification implicitly (and realistically) assumes that 
decisions on the discretionary component of the budget have largely been made by the 
end of the previous year. Notice that a negative value of  x φ  indicates that policymakers 
use discretionary fiscal policy in a systematic countercyclical way: when cyclical 
conditions are expected to improve (i.e., when the output gap forecast rises), 
discretionary fiscal policy becomes more restrictive -- the structural deficit falls.  To 
estimate the above fiscal policy rule, GP replace  { } 1 tt Ex −  with t x , and instrument the 
latter using  1 t x −  and the lagged value of the US output gap (the lagged EU15 output gap 
for the US).  
 
Table 1 reports estimates of  x φ  for each group of countries (EMU, EU3, and 
OECD5), drawn from the GP paper. The top panel shows averages of country-specific  x φ  
estimates, while the bottom panel displays the corresponding estimates based on a panel 
regression.
7 The picture that emerges is reasonably similar for both sets of estimates. 
With the exception of EMU countries in the first half of the sample, the evidence points 
to the existence of a systematic countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy, reflected in the 
negative estimates for x φ . Most interestingly, however, for the three sets of countries the 
GP estimates identify a substantial increase in the absolute value of x φ , thus suggesting a 
much stronger response of fiscal policy to cyclical developments, in a stabilizing 
direction. The previous evolution is particularly relevant for current EMU countries, 
                                                 
7 Details can be found in Galí and Perotti (2003). whose fiscal policy was on average procyclical before 1992, becoming countercyclical 
only in the second half of the sample (and despite the constraints associated with 
Maastricht and the SGP).  
 
Table 2 reports similar evidence obtained by GP, but now focusing on recessions, and 
the strength with which governments have used discretionary policy to fight them.   The 
starting point of the exercise consists of identifying for each country the years in which 
its output gap experiences a decline, during the three main global recession waves of the 
early 80s, the early 90s, and the early 2000s. For each group of countries and recession 
episodes Table 2 shows the (average) ratio between (i) the cumulative change in the 
structural deficit (measured as a share of GDP) over the recession period, and (ii) the 
cumulative change in the output gap over the same period. Since the latter is negative by 
construction, an increase in the structural deficit during the recession (i.e., a 
countercyclical policy response) corresponds to a negative value for the ratio reported. In 
addition the size of the ratio gives us an indication of the intensity of the discretionary 
fiscal response to each recession episode.  
 
The picture that emerges from that exercise is consistent in many dimensions with the 
evidence discussed above, though some qualifications seem relevant. In particular, we see 
how, for the three sets of countries considered, the behavior of discretionary fiscal policy 
during recessions has made a transition from being somewhat procyclical to becoming 
countercyclical. On average, non-EMU countries seem to have experienced that transition 
in the early nineties. EMU countries, on the other hand, kept largely procyclical policies during the recession of the early 90s, which undoubtedly must have contributed to the 
size and persistence of the latter. 
 
Overall the findings reported in GP and summarized above show little evidence that 
Maastricht and SGP-related constraints may have significantly impaired in practice the 
stabilizing role of fiscal policy in EMU countries. If anything, the evidence reported in 
tables 1 and 2 suggests the opposite: it points to the disappearance in the post-Maastricht 
period of the significant pro-cyclicality that characterized (on average) the fiscal policy of 
EMU countries in the previous decade. That development is consistent with what appears 
to be a global trend towards more countercyclical fiscal policies. Interestingly, however, 
EMU countries seem to lag behind the rest of OECD countries in terms of that trend.   
 
The evidence on fiscal policy described above complements some of the findings in 
the recent literature on empirical interest rate rules. That literature points to a significant 
role of monetary policy in the attainment of low and steady inflation and milder 
economic fluctuations, two features that have characterized the past two decades in much 
of the industrialized world.
8  The evidence in GP, summarized above, suggests that the 
improvement in the conduct of economic policies has not been restricted to the monetary 
arena:  fiscal policy in much of the industrialized world seems to have left behind the 




                                                 
8 See,e.g., Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) and Taylor (1999). 5. Concluding Remarks 
 
At the risk of oversimplification, one may summarize the theme underlying much of 
that the new Keynesian research program as follows:  Keynes and his followers got it 
right, but they just did not have the tools. What Keynes “got right” was the notion that the 
fluctuations in the level of economic activity that we observe in industrial economies--
and, most prominently, the recurrent episodes of recession and high unemployment—are, 
to some extent, undesirable and avoidable and that policy can be effective in limiting 
their negative effects. What Keynes did not have were the analytical tools that are 
available to us now and, in particular, the flexible dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) 
models that are at the heart of much recent research on optimal policy in the presence of 
frictions of all sorts. The interest that such research has raised in policy institutions like 
the ECB, the Federal Reserve or the IMF (which are developing their own DGE models 
with nominal rigidities) suggests that we may be getting closer to establishing a strong 
connection between economic theory and macroeconomic policy. APPENDIX A 
  For concreteness, and following GGL’s baseline specification, consider a simple 
economy where the marginal product of labor is given (up to a constant term) 
by , where   denotes output and   is hours worked, both expressed in 
logs and normalized by the size of the working age population. Such a relationship is 
consistent with a conventional Cobb-Douglas production function. Let us assume, on the 
other hand, that the (log) marginal rate of substitution is given by
tt mpn y n =− t
t
t y t n
tt mrs c n σ ϕ =+, 




Given values for σ  (the constant relative risk aversion parameter) and ϕ  (which is 
just the inverse of the labor supply elasticity), the gap measure can be constructed as 
 
  () tt t t gap c n y nt σ ϕ = +− −  
  
Its components are then given by 
 






























where   denotes the (log) nominal marginal cost, 
n
t mc t p  is the (log) price level and  is 
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1980-1991 1992-2002  Change 
Cross-Country Averages           
EMU 0.25  -0.23  -0.48 
EU3 -0.60  -0.91  -0.31 
    OECD5  -0.12  -0.63  -0.51 
           
Panel Estimates          
EMU 0.17  -0.08  -0.25 
EU3 -0.09  -0.76  -0.67 
     OECD5  -0.14  -0.72  -0.58 
 
 
Note: displayed values are estimates of coefficient  x φ  in equation (3) in the text. A 
negative (positive) sign represents a countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal policy, as 
discussed in the text. Source: Galí and Perotti (2003).  





Change in Structural Deficit / Change in Output Gap 
  Early 80s  Early 90s  Early 2000s 
EMU  0.33 0.27 -0.24 
EU3  0.35 -0.64  -0.73 
OECD5  0.20 -0.69  -0.52 
 
Note: displayed values are the ratio of “cumulative changes in the structural deficit” to 
“cumulative changes in the output gap” over recession periods. A negative (positive) sign 
represents countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal policy, as discussed in the text. Source: 
Galí and Perotti (2003) 
 
Figure 1. The GGL Gap 
 
 
















  Source: Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 